How Does the Government Interact With Business?: From History to Controversies by Dibadj, Reza
How DOES THE GOVERNMENT INTERACT WITH
BUSINESS?: FROM HISTORY TO CONTROVERSIES
REZA DLBADJ*




The relationship between American government and American business
is a vast topic of immeasurable complexity. In keeping with the timely and
important theme of this Symposium, yet at the same trying to focus its line
of inquiry, this Article first offers a brief survey of the relationship between
government and business viewed through a regulatory lens. Using this
history as backdrop, it then uses three illustrative doctrinal areas as
symptomatic of how this relationship has become problematic and how it
might be improved.
The piece is structured into two principal sections. Part I provides a
historical overview of the history of regulation in America, as well as two
new paradigms that have emerged in regulatory theory: the regulation of
bottleneck inputs and cooperative federalism. Part II, the core of the
Article, focuses on three controversial areas where the relationship between
government and business has become problematic and is ripe for reform:
corporate and securities law, antitrust and constitutional law. In each area, I
point to problems in current legal arrangements, and suggest a path to
reform.
II. HISTORY
I begin by offering an overview of the history of regulation in America,
as well as a brief foray into two new approaches to regulation.
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. I thank the editors
of the Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal for giving me the opportunity to
present the ideas developed in this paper in Columbus, Ohio, at the March 2010
symposium The Relationship Between American Government and American
Business.
1 See BARTLETr's FAMiLIAR QUOTATIONs 566 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little, Brown,
and Co. 1922) (1855) (quoting Oscar Wilde).
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A. Overarching Cyclicality
Improving the relationship between American government and
American business first requires an understanding of the history of this
relationship. Rather than trying to cover every nuance of a vast waterfront,
I begin by providing a brief perspective on the development of American
regulatory policy2-both economic and social 3 -in four historical phases.
The first phase, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, saw the
birth of the earliest regulatory mandates. In the realm of economic
regulation, the most notable example is the Interstate Commerce
Commission, founded in 1887 to regulate the railroads, and the regulation
of civil aviation beginning with the Air Commerce Act of 1926.5 The most
prominent illustration with respect to social regulation was the formation of
the Bureau of Chemistry in 1908 in response to scandals surrounding
adulterated food and drugs.6 The year 1890 saw the passage of the
Sherman Act-the foundational statute in antitrust law that seeks to prevent
2 Regulation consists of direct public intervention in private contractual
arrangements. See, e.g., David P. Baron, Design ofRegulatory Mechanisms and
Institutions, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1349 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) ("Regulation involves government
intervention in markets in response to some combination of normative objectives
and private interests reflected through politics.").
3 Typically, commentators have divided regulations somewhat loosely into
"economic" regulations on the one hand, and "social" or "health, safety and
environmental" regulations on the other. The former consists of regulating the
practices of an entire industry-historically, this has involved "government-
imposed restrictions on firm decisions over price, quantity, and entry and exit." W.
KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 297 (3d ed.
2000). Canonical examples involve the regulation of railroads, utilities, air
transportation, or telecommunications. The latter type of regulation consists of
rules designed to minimize the risks to citizens and consumers. Rather than
regulating the behavior of an industry in total, social regulations are developed with
regard to specific products or activities-whether it be food preparation,
pharmaceutical development, workplace safety, environmental pollution, municipal
building codes, and the like. See Howard K.Gruenspecht & Lester B. Lave, The
Economics ofHealth, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1509, 1513 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989).
4 For a concise history of economic regulation, see VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 3, at
301-07.
5 See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
See, e.g., Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 3, at 1509. The Bureau of Chemistry
eventually transformed into the FDA in 1931. For a comprehensive timeline of the
foundation and transformation of regulatory agencies, see Clifford Winston et al.,
Explaining Regulatory Policy, in 1994 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONoMIC
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1 (Clifford Winston et al. eds., 1994).
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collusion and monopoly-followed by the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts of 1914.
Despite these early forays into regulation, the contours of the modem
regulatory state were defined only in the second phase-as a reaction to the
excesses of the 1920s and the ensuing Great Depression.8 Roosevelt's New
Deal saw the creation of a number of prominent regulatory agencies, mostly
in the realm of economic regulation. Examples fall into two categories.
The first consists of those designed to make markets work better, such as
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1933) to protect consumers
from unscrupulous banks, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(1935) to reign in Wall Street's excesses. The second category of
interventions sought effectively to manage industry-wide cartels; for
example, the Federal Communications Commission (1934) to manage the
nation's telephones and airwaves, and the Civil Aeronautics Authority
(1938) to set airline rates. The 1930s were a significant decade in
American regulatory policy not only due to the sheer volume of agencies
created, but also because of the virtually unlimited faith progressive
ideology placed in the expertise of these administrative bureaucracies.9
With World War II, the Korean War, and the economic expansion of
the 1950s and early 1960s, few new regulatory mandates emerged.
Antitrust enforcement, for its part, became increasingly strong, especially
with respect to merger reviews-even prompting some commentators to
speak of the emergence of a newly reinvigorated Sherman Act."o Yet the
third phase only began with Lyndon Johnson's plans for a "Great Society"
which brought expansion of social regulation in the mid-1960s. Ironically,
the pace of new social regulation reached a feverish pitch during the
otherwise conservative Nixon administration in the early 1970s. As Kip
Viscusi chronicles:
The decade of the 1970s marked the emergence of almost
every major risk or environmental regulation agency. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [1970], the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [1970],
the Consumer Product Safety Commission [1973], the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration [1972], and
7 See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 745, 763-64 (2004).
8 See Alfred E. Kahn, The Political Feasibility ofRegulatory Reform, in
REFORMING SOCIAL REGULATION: ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC POLICY STRATEGIES 247,
251-52 (Le Roy Graymer & Frederick Thompson eds., 1982).
9 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 350-51 (1982).
1o See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of
Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1947); Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust
Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 569 (2004).
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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [1975] all began
operation in that decade."
Much of this social regulation still stands, at least in form. As the
macroeconomic dislocations of the late 1970s set in, however, a fourth
historical phase began--deeply critical of regulation and drawing
intellectual legitimacy from the so-called "law and economics"
movement.12 Much of the economic regulation began unraveling, hastening
in decades of loosened public oversight on the U.S. economy. . Many
formerly regulated industries-notably the transportation and
telecommunications sectors-began to undergo dramatic change. As one of
the pioneers of deregulation, Alfred Kahn, notes, "by 1981 the federal
government would have deregulated or substantially deregulated trucking,
the airlines, the railroads, and financial markets, and made some progress
toward deregulating communications." 3 Ironically, while one might expect
a deregulated marketplace to place greater emphasis on the importance of
antitrust, antitrust enforcement waned during the 1970s and receded even
more dramatically during the 1980s.14
How to summarize these twists and turns? While ascendant in the early
part of the twentieth century, regulation has suffered a gradual decline in
respectability over the past thirty years. As Paul Joskow and Nancy Rose
summanze:
The massive economic disruptions of the 1930s.gave rise to
a vast array of federal regulations, most of which persisted
through the next forty years. The recent wave of federal
regulatory reforms arose from the substantial supply shocks
and macroeconomic disturbances of the 1970s, which have
been characterized as the most severe disruptions since the
1930s. These reforms have dismantled or refigured much
of the 1930s federal regulatory apparatus."'
In sum, we have witnessed a cycle of regulation and deregulation.
"VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 3, at 637.
12 For three seminal articles in this tradition, see Harvey Averch & Leland L.
Johnson. Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV.
1052 (1962); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960);
George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971).
13 Kahn, supra note 8, at 247.
14 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Sullivan, An Inquiry Into Antitrust, Intellectual Property,
and Broadband Regulation as Applied to the "New Economy, " 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 41, 47 (2001).
's Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1497 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
D. Willig eds., 1989).
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B. Innovation: Bottlenecks and Cooperative Federalism
Beyond the overarching theme of cyclicality, at least some new
regulatory paradigms have evolved. Two examples might give a flavor of
the attempted innovation: substantively, confining regulation narrowly
only to "bottleneck" elements within a system, and procedurally,
experimenting with cooperative federalism as an alternative to either dual
or preemptive federalism.
First, the locus of attention in economic regulation has moved
increasingly away from setting retail rates and controlling the entry and exit
of players, toward the narrow regulation of input "bottlenecks" that where it
is prohibitively expensive for new entrants to compete with incumbents.
The intellectual foundations of this idea were perhaps best developed in
Stephen Breyer's pathbreaking book, Regulation and Its Reform, which
suggested the metaphor of "less restrictive alternatives"' 6 and laid out "a
framework that sees classical regulation as a weapon of last resort and looks
for less restrictive ways to deal with problems thought to call for
regulation."' Breyer's paradigm proved to be quite prescient: as the 1980s
and 1990s unfolded, technological innovation dramatically narrowed the
scope of natural monopoly in a variety of industries. For example, long-
haul telecommunications networks and the generation of electricity can
now be separated from the last mile of local telephone and electricity
wires-with competition possible on the former, regulation can be limited
to the latter."
This new approach allows competition to flourish in the non-bottleneck
portions of the network, while protecting consumers from monopoly rents
in the bottleneck portions. William Rogerson echoes Breyer's suggestion
when he points out that "[r]egulating narrowly defined inputs instead of
outputs is one approach regulators can use to attempt to confine regulation
to as small a sphere as possible, and thereby allow the benefits of
competition to infuse more segments of an industry."' 9 The idea of
regulating critical inputs narrowly has been applied in a variety of
industries, including energy, transportation and telecommunications. 20 To
16 BREYER, supra note 9, at 341.
7 Id at 368.
8 See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer- Welfare Approach to
the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417
(1999).
9 William P. Rogerson, The Regulation ofBroadband Telecommunications, the
Principle ofRegulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for
Investment and Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 135 (2000).
20 See, e.g., Curtis Grimm & Clifford Winston, Competition in the Deregulated
Railroad Industry: Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues, in DEREGULATION OF
NETWORK INDUSTRIES 41, 46 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000); Paul
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be sure, there is significant work to be done-notably determining what to
unbundle and at what price 21-but the idea represents a paradigm shift in
economic regulation.22
A second innovation, more procedural in nature, has been the advent of
cooperative federalism-an attempt to find a middle ground between
'"preemptive federalism' that relies primarily or exclusively on federal
courts or administrative agencies to develop unitary and pinpointed federal
policies . . . [and] 'dual federalism' that leaves the states as autonomous
actors separated from the federal government." 2 3 In their usual incarnation,
cooperative federalism programs "set forth some uniform federal
standards-as embodied in the statute, federal agency regulations, or
both-but leave state agencies with discretion to implement the federal law,
supplement it with more stringent standards and, in some cases, receive an
exemption from federal requirements." 24 Cooperative federalism has been
used in a variety of regulatory contexts where state agencies implement
federal mandates: environmental law, telecommunications and social
L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S.
Electricity Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 120 (1997); Eli M. Noam, Will
Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the Telecommunications Act of
1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 955, 956 (1997).
21 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing ofInputs Sold to
Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1994).
22 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1323, 1361-62 (1998) ("If one
conceives of the regulator under the original paradigm as a sort of ice cap, covering
all aspects of the regulated industry, then the objective under the new paradigm is
to melt away the sphere of regulatory oversight to the smallest industry segment
possible-the so-called bottleneck monopoly.").
3 Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1693 (2001) [hereinafter
Weiser, Cooperative Federalism]. As Weiser elaborates:
In contrast to dual federalism, cooperative federalism envisions a
sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government
and the states that allows states to regulate within a framework
delineated by federal law .... Significantly, these programs
neither leave state authority unconstrained within its domain, as
would a dual federalism program, nor displace such authority
entirely with a unitary federal program, as would a preemptive
federalism .... By crafting a middle ground solution between the
extremes of dual federalism and preemptive federalism, Congress
continues to outstrip existing constitutional rhetoric, which
envisions a separation that does not exist in practice.
Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 664-65 (2001).
24 Weiser, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 23, at 1696.
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services, to name a few.25 To be sure, there are many unanswered
questions, including the appropriateness of states creating federal common
law, as well as possible non-delegation and anti-commandeering
concerns. 26  Nonetheless, much like the move to limit the scope of
economic regulation to bottleneck inputs, cooperative federalism represents
a novel approach to regulation-above and beyond the overarching
message of historical cyclicality.
III. CONTROVERSIES
With this history as a backdrop, I propose focusing on three
contemporary, and controversial, topics to illustrate areas where the
relationship between government and business has become problematic. In
each area, I question current legal arrangements, and propose a path to
reform.
A. Securities Layering
One might expect corporate law to protect shareholders against abuses
by corporate insiders. Unfortunately, though, corporation statutes and
fiduciary duties offer precious little protection to shareholders. State
corporation codes provide the underlying statutory framework for
corporations. These statutes, however, are generally nothing more than a
series of default provisions around which management and shareholders
can theoretically contract. As Mark Roe notes, these codes reflect the belief
that "the corporate law is, or should be, the contract that investors and
managers want"27 -within this mindset, "[c]ontract law seems good, and
corporate law, which also seems good, is in many dimensions a special
form of contract law." 28 In the corporate law vernacular, we live in a world
of "enabling statutes." 29
25 See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority
Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny ofState Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 552
(1999); Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from
Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery under the
Endangered Species Act, 27 COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 45 (2002); Philip J. Weiser,
Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 1 (1999).
26 See Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in
Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1463 (2000).
27 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2491, 2496 (2005).
28 Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 262 (2002).
29 Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for
Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. EcoN. POL'Y 212, 216 (2005) ("State
corporate law is in essence enabling, following a menu approach that permits firms
to alter statutory defaults to fit their needs.").
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For their part, fiduciary duties in corporate law-putatively the duties
of care and loyalty, the waste doctrine, and duties of candor and good
faith-are in fact little more than eloquent rhetorical flourish. Courts have
watered down the duty of care through the "business judgment rule" (BJR)
which presumes that "in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis .. . and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company., 30 The BJR "operates
to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and
affairs of a corporation."31 In effect, the BJR shifts the duty of care from
negligence to gross negligence: violations are found only where there is
"reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of
stockholders" 3 2 or "actions which are without the bounds of reason.3 3 Put
simply, the current duty of care is anemic at best. As one commentator
summarizes:
A director is only liable if he or she is grossly negligent,
and the rule presumes that the director acted with due
care .... If the company has an exculpatory provision in
its articles of incorporation, as nearly all publicly-held
corporations do, the plaintiff-shareholder must prove that
the director failed to act in good faith or intentionally
harmed the corporation. As if these legal standards were
not enough to reduce a director's incentives to act with
care, directors invariably have indemnification rights and
insurance, and courts have limited the ability of
shareholders to obtain discovery in derivative actions
alleging director misconduct.34
The duty of loyalty can have a little more bite, but not much. While
corporate law allows self-dealing transactions, 35 the duty of loyalty
"mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes
precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer, or controlling
shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally."36  Savvy
insiders, however, recognize the way around this duty: approval from an
"independent" body-shareholders or the board, or even a committee
composed of "disinterested" board members. Some corporate codes even
30 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
31 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
32 Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929).
33 Gimbel v. Signal Cos. Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974).
34 Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L.
REv. 353, 377-78 (2004).
3 See, e.g., Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J.
CoRP. L. 333, 334 (2002) ("[T]he decisional law has recognized a relaxation of the
rigor of trust law, primarily with respect to tolerance of self-dealing transactions.").
36 Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
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provide so-called "strong" safe harbor statutes immunizing approved
transactions from any fairness inquiry;37 more importantly, jurisdictions
such as Delaware that scrutinize such approved transactions for fairness,38
nonetheless employ a loose standard.39
Other duties-waste, candor, and good faith-are even weaker.
Showing "waste" is an unusually difficult hurdle to clear, since plaintiffs
must prove "an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could include that the corporation has received
adequate consideration.,4o The duty of candor (or disclosure)-which at
least according to one Delaware case "obligates directors to provide the
stockholders with accurate and complete information material to a
transaction or other corporate event that is being presented to them for
action"41-is unlikely to be an independent duty at all, since it derives
merely "from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
good faith."42
Thus, to the extent that the duty of good faith can even be categorized
as a separate duty, it too devolves into the procedural tricks of care and
loyalty.43 In addition, recent Delaware case law suggests that to be held
liable, plaintiffs must show that defendants intentionally acted in bad
faith." Thus, to the extent an independent duty of good faith even exists,
proving it has become difficult. The big picture that emerges is thus one
filled with rhetoric but low on substance. Empirical evidence even suggests
that investors "seem to consider the Delaware courts' decisions to be
inconsequential as regards shareholders' wealth and, by implication, largely
37 See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2002).
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2004).
39 See, e.g., Cookies Food Prod., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430
N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988); ); In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. S'holders Litig., 663
A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995); Cooke v. Oolie, No. Civ. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034
(Del. Ch. June 23, 1997.
40 Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993).
41 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).42 Id. at 11.
43 Cf In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch.
2005) ("Decisions from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery
are far from clear with respect to whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of good
faith.").
4 See id. at 755 ("[T]he concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious
disregard for one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only)
standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith."). Indeed, if
good faith were read broadly, it would eviscerate the exculpation provisions in
Delaware § 102(b)(7), which does not protect defendants who either violate the
duty of loyalty or act in bad faith. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004).
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indeterminate of the outcome of future cases."4$ As Ed Rock chronicles in
his detailed study of how Delaware corporate law is actually created:
[T]he Delaware courts generate in the first instance the
legal standards of conduct (which influence the
development of the social norms of directors, officers, and
lawyers) largely through what can best be thought of as
"corporate law sermons.".. .[We come much closer to
understanding the role of courts in corporate law4r we
think ofjudges more as preachers than as policemen.
Rock argues "that we should understand Delaware fiduciary duty law
as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors,
tales that collectively describe their normative role." 47
In the end, precious little is left of judicial review:
Over time, state courts interpreted the [fiduciary] duties in
a manner that left little substance. The business judgment
rule and universal adoption of waiver of liability provisions
all but eliminated causes of action for breach of the duty of
care. The duty of loyalty, particularly self-dealing by
officers and directors, could be validated through
procedural mechanisms. With proper procedures, the
fairness of the transaction was not subject to judicial
review. This approach allowed self-dealing by officers and
directors almost without limits. 4 8
Weak fiduciary duties parallel empty statutes: they create the veneer of
regulation and substantive review, respectively, but ultimately provide an
empty core upon which to base corporate governance and protect
shareholders.
In a monumental irony, the core of corporate law runs the risk of
becoming irrelevant to debates on corporate governance. After all, as
scandals have erupted, policymakers have added a series of layers, most
notably the federal securities laws-rather than reexamine why the core of
corporate law is empty. Critics most famously lament the incursion of the
45 Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, OfEconometrics and Indeterminacy: A
Study ofInvestors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV.
551, 603 (1987).
46 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 106.
48 J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance ofState Corporate Law in the Governance
ofPublic Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 3 18-19 (2004) (citations omitted).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) into corporate governance. 49 Contrary
to the conventional wisdom, however, SOX is not a watershed: significant
federal layering has been going on for decades. As Mark Roe has shown in
a series of articles, SOX is just the latest in an array of federal incursions,
which include the Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934, the
Williams Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.50 Roe concludes that:
In nearly every decade of the twentieth century, the
decade's major corporate law issue either went federal or
federal authorities threatened to take it over-from early
twentieth-century merger policy, to the 1930s securities
laws, to the 1950s proxy fights, to the 1960s Williams Act,
to the 1970s going-private transactions.5 1
The layers that Roe describes have arguably benefited shareholders.
Other layers, notably the triad of securities reform statutes enacted from
1995 to 1998-the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), the
National Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA), and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) 52-have been even more pro-
management than state securities laws.53 And federal layering has not
exclusively been through statutes and regulations. Federal courts, led by
the U.S. Supreme Court, have played an important historical role in
fashioning common law remedies, most famously through the federal
common law remedy of implied private rights of action for plaintiffs
alleging fraud or misrepresentation. 54  As Robert Thompson points out,
"[m]assive additions to federal statutes and regulations, and important
governance modifications by self-regulatory organizations, such as the New
York Stock Exchange's changes to its listing requirements, have completely
49Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005).
50 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 611-16 (2003);
Roe, supra note 27, at 2520-23.
51 Roe, supra note 27, at 2498.
52 For a concise description of these laws, see Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity
Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107-09 (2d Cir. 2001).
For a discussion of the differences between state corporate and state securities
laws, see David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16
CARDozo L. REv. 1765, 1769 (1995).
54 The landmark case is Borak, where the Court implied a private right of action
under SEC Rule 14a-9 for false or misleading proxies. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Beginning in the early 1970s, however, implied rights of
action have become less expansive. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (espousing a narrower purview
for federal common law based on federalism concerns).
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overshadowed any response of state law, the traditional source of corporate
law in the United States."5 5
Whenever scandals have shown corporate doctrine to be inadequate,
policymakers have seemingly made a curious choice. Rather than
reexamine why enabling statutes and standard fiduciary duties are
inadequate, lawmakers have added a series of layers-bandages designed to
stem blood from the most recent corporate impropriety or scandal. A
monumental irony has tragically ensued: on the one hand, there are layers
of regulation everywhere; on the other, problems fester and scandals
repeatedly erupt.
Perhaps conveniently, layers hide the hollowness of basic corporate
law.56 The layers-the bandages-shift attention away from the underlying
problem: the empty core. To become relevant again, corporate law must
first be de-layered and simplified. Corporate doctrine must deem hasize
the business judgment rule, and embrace robust fiduciary duties. As I
have argued in detail elsewhere, perhaps this reform can be achieved using
insights from cooperative federalism: the federal government can set a
minimum floor, yet require implementation through state courts using a
reverse-Erie principle. Unless systemic reform occurs, the next scandal
will bring yet another reactive bandage, unwittingly setting the stage for
future scandals. The perennial vicious cycle will continue.
B. Anemic Antitrust
Having fallen victim to the harsh critiques of the Chicago5 9 and public
choice60 schools, antitrust has been in decline for over thirty years. As one
5 Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 Hous. L. REV. 99,
100 (2003).
56 Cf id. at 102 ("[T]he response in state corporate law has been largely one of
silence that has left any modifications in corporate governance to . . . other
actors.").
57 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless
Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 287 (1994); Eric W. Orts,
Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
265, 280(1998).
5 See Reza Dibadj, From Incongruity to Cooperative Federalism, 40 U.S.F. L.
REv. 845 (2006).
59 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 408 (1978) (noting that
antitrust exhibits "the paradox of great popularity and vigorous enforcement
coupled with internal contradiction and intellectual decadence") (emphasis added);
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984)
(lamenting that "the history of antitrust is filled with decisions that now seem
blunders").
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commentator sums it up, "[i]ts fervor fading, its doctrines fraying, antitrust
is becoming a religion without a cause." 61 But how has antitrust law-once
heralded by the United States Supreme Court as "the Magna Carta of free
enterprise [and] as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms"62 -descended into this mess?
The root of the problem is that antitrust has lost sight of its goal:
consumer welfare.63 Remarkably, through a curious and often overlooked
sleight of hand, the Chicago school has brilliantly managed to redefine
consumer welfare as allocative efficiency. Robert Bork, for instance,
believes that the "closer the members of the industry come to maximizing
their profits, the closer they come to maximizing the welfare of
consumers"64 since it is an "obvious fact that more efficient methods of
doing business are as valuable to the public as they are to businessmen."65
Indeed, for him, the "whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort
to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." 66
Similarly, Frank Easterbrook cleverly equates efficiency with consumer
60 See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II, The Unjoined Debate, in
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 341 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) ("[I]t
is commonly recognized that antitrust has failed.").
61 Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline ofAntitrust and the Delusions of Models: The
Faustian Pact ofLaw and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1512-13 (1984).
62 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). See also Nat'l Coll.
Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27
(1984) (quoting N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958)) ("The
Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.").
61 See Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 107; Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
6 BORK, supra note 59, at 97.
65 Id. at 4.66 Id. at 91. As Robert Lande observes:
Judge Bork asserts that the sole purpose of the Sherman Act was
enhancement of "consumer welfare" a term of art ... This view
of "consumer welfare" includes maximum economic efficiency
but excludes anything giving preference to consumers over
monopolists or any concern with "unfair" transfers of wealth
from consumers to monopolists.
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 84
(1982).
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welfare, and Richard Posner extols the virtues of efficiency, even
suggesting that the "small businessman usually is helped rather than hurt by
monopoly."68 Perhaps most stunning is the lack of any empirical evidence
to support these sweeping claims.
While rhetorically masterful,69 such logic leaves much to be desired.
As Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan amusingly describe:
[T]he Chicago School defines competition in terms of
efficiency; defines efficiency as the absence of
inefficiency; defines inefficiency in terms of artificial
output restraint; and thus concludes that any activity that
does not demonstrably limit output is efficient and
therefore procompetitive. Thus, it "proves" that almost all
business activity is efficient-a neat trick.70
Put simply, if one believes "all business activity is efficient" then there
is precious little role for antitrust. Unfortunately, such theorizing ignores
the reality that while economists generally consider competition to be
beneficial since it forces resources to be allocated to their most efficient
use, for a self-interested business, competition means lower profits. 72In
67 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage?, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 6 (1999) ("Modem antitrust law thus is a search for
economic explanations of problematic conduct. If the explanations show the
conduct efficient-and therefore ultimately to consumers' benefit-then the court
stays its hand; if not, the court condemns the conduct.") (emphasis added).
68 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2 (2d ed. 2001).
69 As Robert Skitol notes, "[w]hile Chicago School adherents trumpeted their
support of 'consumer welfare,' they used that term in a counterintuitive manner to
mean overall economy-wide efficiency rather than the protection of consumers as a
class distinct from producers or a producer's shareholding owners." Robert A.
Skitol, The Shifting Sands ofAntitrust Policy: Where It Has Been, Where It Is Now,
Where It Will Be in Its Third Century, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 239, 249
(1999).
70 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 936, 959 (1987) (citation omitted). See also Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm
to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST
L.J. 371, 379 (2002) ("The 1980s victory of the Chicago School was more a victory
of economic libertarianism and political conservatism than of maximization of a
microeconomic welfare function.").
71 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated
Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1005, 1006 (1987) ("One might describe these goals
as the 'benefits' that can flow from workable competition, namely (1) prices close
to incremental costs, leading to buying and production decisions that minimize
economic waste, (2) efficient production processes, and (3) innovation as to both
product and production process.").
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the candid words of one article in the business press, "[b]usinessmen, by
and large, don't like free and open markets. From John D. Rockefeller on,
they have found markets to be messy, chaotic, and insufficiently
profitable."73 As such, the point is simple: government has a role to play-
through the antitrust laws-to ensure competitive markets.
Regrettably, anemic antitrust has engendered pernicious consequences:
two obvious and two subtle. First, policymakers have stood by and
condoned the creation of large corporate behemoths in industries as diverse
as financial services, airlines, telecommunications, and computer hardware
and software. 74 A recent and leading antitrust monograph even declares
that the "very ubiquity of merger-created efficiencies is why we evaluate
mergers under a fairly benign set of rules."75  There is no discussion,
however, of what these "efficiencies" are and whether they will be passed
onto consumers. Sadly enough, one is hard-pressed to find cases where
industry concentration has actually helped consumers: it is no coincidence
76
that consumer advocates tend to oppose mergers.
Second, and occasionally following from the first, is that these
companies become so gargantuan that they become "too-big-to-fail"
(TBTF)-a brilliant way to internalize profits when things go well, and
externalize costs when they do not. When the putative synergies of
expensive acquisitions do not pan out, macroeconomic conditions
deteriorate, or scandals grow out of control, taxpayers come to the rescue.
Even though they seem small by the size of today's interventions, in the
1980s taxpayers were asked to avenge the savings and loan industry's death
through a $150 billion bailout,77 and in the 1990s the Federal Reserve
marshaled financial institutions to provide nearly $4 billion to bailout the
investment fund Long-Term Capital Management. With respect to our
current crisis, consider that financial actors were chasing higher returns in
areas such as subprime lending and the trading of esoteric financial
instruments-to belabor the obvious, any profits made from these activities
72 Indeed, in the theoretical case of "long run competitive equilibrium, firms earn
zero economic profits." KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW 9 (2003).
7 Alan Murray, Exile on G Street: Bush's Economists Play Peripheral Role, WALL
ST. J., May 13, 2003, at A4.
7 4 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Deregulation: A Tragedy in Three Acts, WASH. POST, Sept.
13, 2003, at A21; Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REv. 1749,
1769 (1995).
7 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 219 (2005).
76 See, e.g., Deregulated, CONSUMER REP., July 2002, at 30.
n See, e.g., Bob Keefe, Some Not Ready to Toss Lifelines to All Those Ailing,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 5, 2001, at A8.
78 See, e.g., Peter Coy, How the Game Was Played-And Why Long-Term Lost,
Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1998, at 41.
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would belong to them. All this might be fine as far as it goes, provided of
course that the financial actors also suffer any losses they may incur from
their risky escapades. Yet instead, when things have gone wrong, these
seemingly sophisticated actors instead turn to the federal government for a
handout, on the theory that they are simply TBTF.79 To add insult to
injury, taxpayers are unwittingly funding the next round of consolidation-
to the extent bailout money is used for mergers and acquisitions, the actors
in the next crisis will be even bigger and more destabilizing.
The culminating affront here, of course, is that it is the individual-the
ordinary taxpayer who might have already suffered mightily as shareholder
and consumer-who is asked to be the insurer of last resort. Legal critics
Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch point to the stunning inconsistency:
Conventional free-market ideology extols the virtues of
private capital accumulation, entrepreneurial skill, and the
harsh reality of risk. Yet tax breaks are granted to entice
industries to invest or remain in localities. Cities compete
for the opportunity to provide sports teams with ever more
luxurious stadiums. Huge companies get government help
when they face financial ruin. Private companies rarely
turn down the opportunity to feed greedily at the public
trough.8 0
Lax antitrust has thus brought with it a peculiar absurdity: the public as
benefactor of last resort, as already-suffering taxpayers reallocate resources
precisely to those corporations that were imprudent in the first place.
Above all, TBTF facilitates hypocrisy: extol the virtues of free markets and
private profits, then conveniently come begging to government to socialize
the losses.
Beyond these two rather obvious implications that emerge from
weakened antitrust, two more subtle realities emerge. The first is a missed
opportunity for economic regulation and antitrust to learn from each other
and develop common analytical tools. For instance, on the one hand,
economic regulation struggles with how to regulate bottleneck inputs; 8 on
the other, antitrust law has developed the "essential facilities" doctrine
7 Quite interestingly, approximately three years prior to the start of the most recent
financial crisis, two Federal Reserve officials argued that the TBTF scenario would
apply to several banks: their collapse would so harm the overall economy, that
government would have no choice but to bail them out. See Gary H. Stem & Ron
Feldman, Big Banks, Big Bailouts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at A14.
80 Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch., The Public-Private Distinction in American Law
andLife, 36 BuFF. L. REv. 237, 249 (1987) (emphasis added).
81 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
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which could be applied to the bottleneck problem.82 After all, like
bottlenecks, essential facilities tend to be "capital assets that cannot be
economically duplicated given the size of the market-a communications
network, a central terminal facility, stadium, or energy transmission
facilities."a Scholars who see this connection have argued, for example,
that regulators would improve their lot by becoming "limited-jurisdiction
enforcer[s] of antitrust principles, applying a version of the 'essential
facilities' doctrine in a single industry,"84 or that "academics and
practitioners ought to be searching for ways to define and limit the
obligation to deal with competitors. Ultimately, the best way to accomplish
this is to use a narrowly defined essential facilities doctrine as the sole
foundation for imposing such a duty.,,s Yet despite these insights, the
essential facilities doctrine-roundly criticized by many commentators 86 -
currently inhabits the fringes of a diminished antitrust law.87
82 The "essential facilities" doctrine carves out an exception to the general rule that
a firm has no obligation to deal with its competitors by stating that under certain
circumstances, a refusal to deal is subject to a monopolization claim under § 2 of
the Sherman Act. For an overview of the doctrine, see ROBERT PITOFSKY, THE
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE UNDER UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW (2002),
available at http://www.fic.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/
pitofskyrobert.pdf. The clearest judicial articulation of the doctrine is in MCI
Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co, where the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit developed a four-part test that must be met to invoke the
essential facilities doctrine. The test consists of showing "(1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility
to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility." MCI Commc'ns
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
83 Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1207 (2002).
8 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1361 (1998) (citation
omitted).
85 Robinson, supra note 83 at 1203 (emphasis omitted).
86 See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 305 (2d ed. 1999)
("The antitrust world would almost certainly be in a better place if it [the essential
facilities doctrine] were jettisoned."); Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An
Epithet in Need ofLimiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1990)
(arguing essential facilities is "less a doctrine than an epithet"); Michael Boudin,
Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 397-402 (1986)
(calling the doctrine one of "dubious character" and "embarrassing weakness").
87 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he provision describing which elements must be unbundled does
not explicitly refer to the analogous 'essential facilities' doctrine (an antitrust
doctrine that this Court has never adopted) . . . .").
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Second, and equally subtly, anemic antitrust has facilitated the ability
of deregulators to pass the buck. To begin with, consider that it is all too
easy for those enamored of deregulation to argue that industry
concentration is not a regulatory problem per se; after all, reigning in big or
powerful companies is antitrust's job. For example, Alfred Kahn correctly
notes that "deregulation permits a fuller exploitation of monopoly
power[,]"" adding that "[w]hile prepared to defend enthusiastically the
deregulations with which I have been involved, I feel equally strongly that
they have greatly accentuated the importance of antitrust enforcement." 89
Even a casual glance at the economic history of the past half century,
however, reveals a similar pattern: a push for deregulation coupled with the
clever argument that the antitrust laws would protect competition, followed
precisely by the creation of oligopolistic behemoths in a range of industries
from airlines to financial services. We regrettably live in an era where
policymakers and pundits can conveniently avoid responsibility whenever
deregulation goes awry simply by sloughing off responsibility to lax
antitrust enforcement-like the child's game of "hot potato."
What permits this game? Historically, antitrust and regulation have
been bifurcated, and remain so in the minds of prominent observers.
Stephen Breyer, for example, draws a contrast between "private
anticompetitive behavior,"90 the domain of antitrust, and "market
failure[s]" 91 which call for regulation:
The antitrust laws seek to create or maintain the conditions
of a competitive marketplace rather than replicate the
results of competition or correct for the defects of
competitive markets. In doing so, they act negatively,
through a few highly general provisions prohibiting certain
forms of private conduct. They do not affirmatively order
firms to behave in specified ways; for the most part, they
tell private firms what not to do.92
Herbert Hovenkamp notes that as markets "pass out of the realm of
strict agency control and into the realm of private, market-based decision
88Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7
YALE J. ON REG. 325, 338 (1990).
89 Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1059, 1059
(1987). See also ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH 47(2004)
("Deregulation shifts the major burden of consumer protection to the competitive
market, and therefore, in important measure, to the enforcement of the antitrust
laws.").
90 See BREYER, supra note 9, at 160.
91 See id.92 Id. at 156-57.
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making, antitrust picks up where the regulatory regime leaves off"93 Paul
Joskow warns how "[e]fforts to mix antitrust policies designed to promote
competition with regulatory policies that restrict it can cause numerous
difficulties." 94
A new and different perspective is to recognize that "[a]ntitrust is
nothing if not economic regulation," 95 and that the "attempt to draw a sharp
demarcation between antitrust and regulatory objectives is a mistake." 96
Indeed, instead of relying on retail rate regulation, regulators are
increasingly trying to create an environment where competition can
flourish. More generally, as Thomas Moore points out, "[t]he Sherman
Act . .. [is] the most encompassing regulatory statute and the second oldest
federal regulatory law . . . . Only recently have economists begun to
recognize that the antitrust laws are regulatory statutes."98
The advantages of bucking the conventional wisdom should hopefully
be apparent. First, a new bridge between these two traditionally distinct
areas of policy allows the development of common analytical tools. As
William Baumol and Gregory Sidak observe:
This harmony between regulation and antitrust has three
important implications. First, the same basic tools of
microeconomic analysis can be employed in one as in the
other .... Second, changes in technology or other
circumstances that permit natural monopoly to give way to
competition impart continuity to the relationship between
economic regulation and antitrust. Third, many of the
thorniest problems in antitrust law ... are fundamentally
regulatory in nature, involving issues such as entry or the
pricing of intermediate goods sold to competitors. Thus,
9 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Treatise in Antitrust Analysis, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 815, 832 (1996) (emphasis added).
94 Paul L. Joskow, Mixing Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in the Electric Power
Industry: The Price Squeeze and Retail Market Competition, in ANTITRUST AND
REGULATION 173 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985).
9 George Bittlingmayer, The Economic Problem ofFixed Costs and What Legal
Research Can Contribute, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 739, 744 (1989).
96 Robinson, supra note 83, at 1184.
9 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 84, at 1361 ("[U]nder the new
paradigm, the regulator plays a far more limited role. Instead of comprehensively
overseeing an industry in order to protect the end-user, its principal function is to
maximize competition among rival providers, in the expectation that competition
will provide all the protection necessary for end-users.") (emphasis added).
98 Thomas Gale Moore, Introduction to Antitrust and Economic Efficiency: A
Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, 28 J.L. & ECON. 245, 245 (1985).
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the economic scholarship on regulation can in many
instances enrich antitrust jurisprudence. 99
Put more starkly, "antitrust and regulation ... strike the same rocks." 00
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, if antitrust and regulation are
viewed holistically, it becomes more difficult for regulatory pundits to pass
the buck when things go awry. Responsibility just might breed reform.
In the end, as a leading monograph reminds us, antitrust "is a far
humbler enterprise today than it was several decades ago."10' Regrettably,
the current ethos has lost sight of the fact that antitrust "was premised upon
a politicalldudgment that decentralized market power was essential to a free
society."' To achieve this overarching goal, the antitrust enterprise could
afford a little less modesty.
C. Constitutional Deregulation?
The use of constitutional rhetoric to push back government regulation
is, of course, not new-perhaps most famously, Lochner invalidated a New
York state law seeking to regulate working conditions based on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.103 After a decades-long
relative dormancy, using the Constitution to invalidate regulation is once
again in vogue, as perhaps best evidenced by cases where the United States
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari. The strategy comes in
various flavors. For example, some litigants have tried to undermine the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by arguing that the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), set up under SOX, violates the
Appointments Clause and constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.'0 Others have tried to invalidate the convictions of
white collar criminals by arguing that one of the bases under which they
have been convicted, the "honest services" fraud statute,'05 is
unconstitutionally vague. 06
9 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 27 (1994) (citation omitted).
'" JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 277 (2000).
1o1 HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, at 7.
102 Minda, supra note 74, at 1755 (citation omitted).
103 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
'os See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) ("For the purposes of this chapter, the term
'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of
the intangible right of honest services.").
"0 See United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S.
Ct. 393 (2009); United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
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While each of these arguments deserves careful attention, I will focus
on what has perhaps been the most audacious, and to date spectacularly
successful, argument: treating corporations as "persons" deserving of
constitutional rights, most famously with respect to First Amendment
protections. The history of this stunning and sweeping grant is entirely
unsatisfactory, and dates back to two sentences in the headnote of a
Supreme Court opinion from 1886 which simply state that the "court does
not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. . .applies to these corporations.
We are all of the opinion that it does."107 Perhaps the Court did not "wish
to hear argument" on this issue because granting corporations such rights
rests on dubious grounds.'08
After all, corporations are artificial creatures of the state, and they only
exist at the whim of the state. The state has already given them
"superhuman" powers, such as limited liability and perpetual life.' 09 As
Justice White observes in his dissent in the famous First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti case:
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the
purpose of furthering certain economic goals. In order to
facilitate the achievement of such ends, special rules
relating to such matters as limited liability, perpetual life,
and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets
are normally applied to them. States have provided
corporations with such attributes in order to increase their
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (2009); United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2379 (2009).
107 Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). As Justice
Rehnquist notes, the "Court decided at an early date, with neither argument nor
discussion, that a business corporation is a 'person' entitled to the protection of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
0 8 See John Henry Brebbia, First Amendment Rights and the Corporation, 35 PUB.
REL. J. 16, 18 (1979) ("Generations of constitutional scholars and Supreme Court
Justices have argued that corporations, having no human nature, have no human
rights.").
' One commentator notes the supervening irony here:
The corporate drive for constitutional parity with "real" humans
comes at a time when legislatures are awarding these artificial
persons superhuman privileges. Besides perpetual life,
corporations enjoy limited liability for industrial accidents such
as nuclear power disasters, and the use of voluntary bankruptcy
and other means to dodge financial obligations while remaining
in business.
Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill ofRights,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 658-59 (1990).
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
economic viability and thus strengthen the economy
generally. It has long been recognized, however, that the
special status of corporations has placed them in a position
to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if
not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the
very heart of our democracy, the electoral process.no
It would defy logic to argue that the state creating this artificial entity
not be able to regulate its speech-a lapse that cannot simply be swept
under the rug.
The latest major volley is the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens
United v. FEC, where five Justices agreed to declare unconstitutional
certain limitations, contained in the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
law, on how corporations spend money to support or oppose political
candidates."' The majority's opinion is problematic in that it seems to pay
little attention to the structures that allow private parties to manipulate
government. As Amitai Etzioni notes:
The economic literature is replete with distortions the
government causes in the markets. Comparable attention
should be paid to manipulations of the government by
participants in the market, and the effects of these
manipulations on the internal structures of markets. A
major way these manipulations are carried out is for
corporations, banks, farmers, and labor unions to use their
political power to significantly and systematically affect
the outcomes of market transactions."12
One could be forgiven for believing that corporations' success should
rest on their business advantages, not on their ability to manipulate
government. Not to mention that allowing corporations further into the
political process will only exacerbate the existing concern that our
representative democracy disproportionately favors monied interests-
notwithstanding the reassurance of "one person, one vote." 13 These factors
breed cynicism.
no Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
"' See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).1 12 AMITAi ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW EcoNOMICs 217
(1988).
113 See, e.g., Stanley Aronowitz, Against the Liberal State: ACT- UP and the
Emergence ofPostmodern Politics, in SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND
IDENTITY POLITICs 357, 363 (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995)
("The power of capital resides, principally, in the public perception that, in the
absence of an alternative economic discourse and plan, corporations . .. hold the
economic strings .... Almost everybody who counts in political terms accepts the
idea that no fiscal program can be perceived to hurt business."); Linda Nicholson &
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Overly expansive corporate speech thus represents a brilliant attempt to
use vast aggregations of money to ward off regulation. But the strategy
runs far deeper than speech or the First Amendment. It runs to the Bill of
Rights more broadly. As one commentator chronicles:
[C]orporations and their managers. . .successfully have
used the Bill of Rights as a shield against government
regulation. Businesses now wield the Bill of Rights in
much the same way that the fourteenth amendment was
used during the Progressive era when corporations impeded
state governmental regulation with constitutional
roadblocks. In this sense, the supposedly defunct doctrine
of substantive due process-under which the Court
imposes its own economic views to strike down
regulation-retains surprising vitality. Indeed, the current
era can be categorized as one of corporate due process.114
The agenda is to use the Bill of Rights to sidestep economic regulation,
much like the Lochner era relied on Fourteenth Amendment due process
claims.
Reform is possible. The most straightforward, though least likely,
option would be a constitutional amendment that clarifies once and for all
that corporations are not "persons" privy to the protections of the
Constitution: created by legislatures, they can only enjoy benefits conferred
to them by legislatures."'
Short of this broad remedy, and in the wake of Citizens United, the
single most urgent area for change is likely campaign finance reform.116
Steven Seidman, Introduction, in SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY
POLITICS 1, 31 (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995) ("[L]iberal
majoritarian politics is threatened by business interests which increasingly dictate
public policy-demanding tax breaks or deferment of public investment-by its
threat to relocate or significantly reduce their present investments.").
114 Mayer, supra note 109, at 577-78.
11 See, e.g., id. at 660 ("[A] constitutional amendment is needed that declares
corporations are not persons and that they are only entitled to statutory protection
conferred by legislatures and referendums.").
116 See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, NEXT: THE ROAD TO THE GOOD SOCIETY xi (2001)
("Can campaign financing be thoroughly reformed, not by our current method of
merely closing one floodgate as money gushes over and around the dam and
everywhere else, but in a way that will stop the drift toward a plutocracy of one
dollar, one vote?"); Steven P. Croley, Theories ofRegulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1998) ("[I]f the relationship
between legislators and regulation-seeking interest groups constitutes the real
lynchpin of the public choice theory-then reforms in the area of campaign
finance, for one example, might go far to alleviate the problems that lead public
choice theorists to call for deregulation.").
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Perhaps it might finally be time to consider publicly financing federal
election campaigns. In the interim, Congress might prohibit entities
receiving federal money, such as federal contractors and bailout recipients,
from spending on the electoral process. It could place limits on the ability
to deduct the cost of influencing elections, or even impose a tax on monies
so spent. Congress could require corporate executives to identify
themselves in their advertisements and note their approval of the message
contained therein-much like political candidates already have to do. The
Securities and Exchange Commission could craft rules requiring publicly-
traded corporations to disclose, with specificity and with minimal delay,
their political spending. A complementary option would be to require
shareholder votes to approve the spending of the corporation's money to
influence the political process.
Above all, reform can only begin if citizens begin to ask whether
corporations should also benefit from constitutional protections designed to
protect individual liberties from majoritarian impulses. Once the logical
lapse is scrutinized, the specifics of change can follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past forty years, we have been seduced by the notion that
society can organize its collective economic life simply by having
government get out of the way, and allowing private actors to bargain
among themselves to achieve an efficient outcome. But this belies the
reality that, at the very least, government needs to create an environment
where free and open markets can operate in the public interest. As Ronald
Coase points out, "for anything approaching perfect competition to exist, an
intricate system of rules and regulations would normally be needed."ll7 Put
simply, such markets do not happen by accident.118 This is not even to
117 R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 9 (1988). Advocates of the
laissez-faire, who too often rely on simplistic readings of Coase's work,
conveniently forget that in his pathbreaking article, The Problem ofSocial Cost,
Coase makes it clear that
[T]here is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental
administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in
economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely
when ... a large number of people are involved and in which
therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or
the firm may be high.
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1, 18 (1960).
118 As Frederic Jameson observes, "to get it right, you have to talk about real
markets just as much as about metaphysics, psychology, advertising, culture,
representations, and libidinal apparatuses." FREDERIC L. JAMESON,
POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 264 (1991). In
the words of one commentator:
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mention the important role citizens expect government to play in difficult
times. As Stephen Croley observes:
Americans have repeatedly turned to federal regulatory
government in times of crisis to address the country's most
stubborn problems-from the banking crises and business
corruption of the early twentieth century, through the Great
Depression, stock market crisis, and labor unrest of the
1930s and 1940s, through the environmental crisis and civil
rights revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, to the threat of
terrorism and the creation of the huge Department of
Homeland Security at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, to name a few." 9
Despite this reality, tremendous energy has been spent criticizing
government. Unfortunately though, as Ezra Suleiman forcefully argues in
his study of the demise of public administration, "The virulent attacks on
state bureaucracy ... have helped to undermine politics, political
involvement, and citizenship. They have in the process undermined the
democratic polity by delegitimizing themselves and their political
functions." 2 0
Let us not get so distracted that we forget that the "the critical question
is who uses the government for what ends."' 2 ' The challenge is thus not to
abandon government, but to find ways to make it better, to go beyond and
"create a regulatory superstructure that encourages the betterment of
regulatory technology itself. . . for it is nothing less than the aspiration that
Today, the instinctive distrust of any governmental action, and
the almost religious faith in free markets, which characterized the
deregulatory movement, seem somewhat naive. There is a
growing recognition instead that unregulated markets do not
necessarily operate perfectly, that successful, anticompetitive
behavior by firms is in fact more plausible and common than we
perhaps thought, and the social costs of these phenomena are
substantial.
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying the New Antitrust Learning
to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479, 1501 (1999).
"
9 STEPHEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 3 (2008).
120 EzRA SULEIMAN, DISMANTLING DEMOCRATIC STATES 4 (2003). Similarly, John
Kenneth Galbraith labels the "massive ideological attack [that] has been mounted
on public regulation in and of the economy" as an "escape from thought." JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GOOD SOCIETY 76 (1996).
121 Warren J. Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14
J. L. & ECON. 435, 442 (1971).
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government, like all things human, can improve."l 2 2 In improving the
relationship between American government and American business, neither
defeatism nor effrontery is in order.
122 John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian
Realism, and the Technology ofRegulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1071, 1080
(2000).
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